Games and Economic Behavior

最新文章

• Reputation and impermanent types AI翻译
  作者：Wiseman, Thomas
  作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
  摘要：I consider a version of the chain store game where the incumbent firm's type evolves according to a Markov process with two states: a tough type who always fights entry, and a weak type who prefers to accommodate. There exists a minimal level of persistence necessary for the incumbent to be able to sustain any reputation for being tough. Above that level, as the number of markets T increases, in equilibrium play alternates between intervals of entry by competitors and intervals of deterrence. ...
• Efficient communication in the electronic mail game AI翻译
  作者：De Jaegher, Kris
  作者单位：Utrecht University
  摘要：The literature on the electronic mail game shows that players' mutual expectations may lock them into requiring an inefficiently large number of confirmations and confirmations of confirmations from one another. This paper shows that this result hinges on the assumption that, with the exception of the first message, each player can only send a message when receiving an immediately preceding message. We show that, once this assumption is lifted, equilibria involving confirmations of confirmatio...
• List of Michael Maschler's publications AI翻译
  作者：[Anonymous]
• Advertising, brand loyalty and pricing AI翻译
  作者：Chioveanu, Ioana
  作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
  摘要：I consider an oligopoly model where, prior to price competition, firms invest in persuasive advertising and induce brand loyalty ill consumers who Would otherwise buy the cheapest alternative oil the market. This setting in which persuasive advertising is introduced to homogeneous product markets. provides an alternative explanation for price dispersion phenomena. Despite ex ante symmetry, the equilibrium profile of advertising Outlays is asymmetric. It follows that endogenously determined bra...
• Adaptation and complexity in repeated games AI翻译
  作者：Maenner, Eliot
  作者单位：University of Copenhagen
  摘要：The paper presents a learning model for two-player infinitely repeated games. In an inference step players construct minimally complex inferences of strategies based on observed play, and in an adaptation step players choose minimally complex best responses to an inference. When players randomly select an inference from a probability distribution with full support the set of steady states is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in which only stage game Nash equilibria are played. When player...
• Diffusion in complex social networks AI翻译
  作者：Lopez-Pintado, Dunia
  作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
  摘要：This paper studies how a behavior spreads in a population. We consider a network of interacting agents whose actions are determined by the actions of their neighbors, according to a simple diffusion rule. We find, using a mean-field approach, the threshold for the spreading rate above which the behavior spreads and becomes persistent in the population. This threshold crucially depends on the connectivity distribution of the social network and on specific features of the diffusion rule. (c) 200...
• Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms AI翻译
  作者：Dawid, Herbert; MacLeod, W. Bentley
  作者单位：Columbia University; Columbia University; University of Bielefeld; University of Bielefeld
  摘要：The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution of bargaining norms in a simple production problem with two-sided relationship specific investments and competition. The puzzle we wish to address is why efficient bargaining norms do not evolve even though there exist efficient sequential equilibria. Conditions under which stochastically stable bargaining conventions exist are characterized, and it is shown that there is a hierarchy of norms, with a stochastically stable division rule that...
• Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences AI翻译
  作者：Masso, Jordi; Nicolo, Antonio
  作者单位：University of Padua; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
  摘要：We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose in alternative front a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. All allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set Of its users. Agents have gregarious Preferences over allocations: given all allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent call be forced to be a User and no agent wh...
• Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow AI翻译
  作者：Hausken, Kiell
  作者单位：Universitetet i Stavanger
  摘要：A terrorist defends an asset which grows from the first to the second period and is attacked. With large asset growth, the terrorist's first period outcome is low caused by a large attack. With no expenditure constraint. the terrorist's total outcome is positive. With equal attack and defense inefficiencies, when the terrorist as defender requires his first period outcome to be positive, the attacker eliminates the asset ill the first period when asset growth multiplied with the Square roots o...
• Aversion to norm-breaking:: A model AI翻译
  作者：Lopez-Perez, Raul
  作者单位：Autonomous University of Madrid
  摘要：In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) Many subjects cooperate Contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) Subjects often punish those others who behave Unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocity. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights rese...