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作者：Porter, Ryan; Nudelman, Eugene; Shoham, Yoav
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We present two simple search methods for computing a sample Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game: one for 2-player games and one for n-player games. Both algorithms bias the search towards supports that are small and balanced, and employ a backtracking procedure to efficiently explore these supports. Making use of a new comprehensive testbed, we test these algorithms on many classes of games, and show that they perform well against the state of the art-the Lemke-Howson algorithm for 2-player...
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作者：Mezzetti, Claudio; Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa; Tsetlin, Ilia
作者单位：University of Leicester; Duke University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k(1) objects are sold in the first round and k(2) in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k = k(1) + k(2) objects than in a sequential...
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作者：Mannor, Shie; Shinikin, Nahum
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; McGill University
摘要：Regret minimization in repeated matrix games has been extensively studied ever since Hannan's seminal paper [Hannan, J., 1957. Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play. In: Dresher, M., Tucker, AW., Wolfe, P. (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. III. Ann. of Math. Stud., vol. 39, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 97-193]. Several classes of no-regret strategies now exist; such strategies secure a long-term average payoff as high as could be obtained by the fixed actio...
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作者：Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Bologna
摘要：We illustrate. by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium char...
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作者：Friedman, Daniel; Ostrov, Daniel N.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; Santa Clara University
摘要：We formalize Veblen's idea of conspicuous consumption its two alternative forms of interdependent preferences, dubbed envy and pride. Agents adjust consumption patterns gradually, in the direction of increasing utility. From an arbitrary initial state, the distribution of consumption among agents with identical preferences converges to a unique equilibrium distribution. When pride is stronger, the equilibrium distribution has a right-skewed density. When envy is stronger, the equilibrium is co...
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作者：Castillo, Marco E.; Cross, Philip J.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Georgetown University
摘要：We study behavioral differences across and within genders in a family of ultimatum and dictator games, We find these differences are due not only to altruistic preferences but also beliefs about the strategic behavior of others. The behavior of men in strategic Situations is not significantly more aggressive than women on average. But this average masks wide variation in intra-gender behavior. In particular, a sizable minority of males are mice, behaving timidly in strategic environments. Our ...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.; Dokumaci, Emin; Lahkar, Ratul
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. At interior population states, the standard microfoundations for the replicator dynamic can be converted into Foundations For the projection dynamic by replacing imitation of opponents with revision driven by insecurity and direct choice of alternative strategies. Both dynamics satisfy a condition called inflow-outflow symmetry, which causes them to select against strictly dominated strategies at...
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作者：Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
摘要：The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assessment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the...
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作者：Ely, Jeffrey; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位：Harvard University; Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785-814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the lo...
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作者：Dickinson, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire
作者单位：University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate agents to increase their effort, whereas the crowding-out literature suggests that the opposite may occur. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the employment relationship is taken into account [Frey, B., 1993. Does monitoring increase work effort? The rivalry between trust and loyalty. Econ. Inquiry 31, 663-670]. Results from controlled laboratory experiments show that ...
