Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dawid, Herbert; MacLeod, W. Bentley
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Columbia University; University of Bielefeld; University of Bielefeld
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.004
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 26-52
• 关键词: evolution of norms; Fair division; INVESTMENT; stochastic stability

摘要

The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution of bargaining norms in a simple production problem with two-sided relationship specific investments and competition. The puzzle we wish to address is why efficient bargaining norms do not evolve even though there exist efficient sequential equilibria. Conditions under which stochastically stable bargaining conventions exist are characterized, and it is shown that there is a hierarchy of norms, with a stochastically stable division rule that is independent of the long run investment strategy. Due to this independence, efficient sequential equilibria are not in general stochastically stable. This result may help us understand why institutions, such as firms, may be needed to ensure efficient relationship specific investments. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.