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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study axioms which define representative democracy in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We ca...
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作者：Norman, Thomas W. L.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, E, 2001. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17, 141-162] provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets ...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper introduces discrete large games where the set of players is a countable dense 'grid' with a finitely additive distribution. In these games an), function from player names to mixed actions is a legitimate strategy profile. No extraneous continuity or measurability conditions are assumed. Randomness can be modeled explicitly and ail exact law of large numbers holds. Equilibria enjoy a strong purification property: every realization of every mixed strategy equilibrium is a pure strateg...
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作者：Pawlowitsch, Christina
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：This paper gives a complete characterization of neutrally stable strategies for sender-receiver games in the style of Lewis, or Nowak and Krakauer [Lewis, D., 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA; Nowak, M., Krakauer, D., 1999. The evolution of language. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 8028-8033]. Due to the dynamic implications of neutral stability, the replicator dynamics of this model does not necessarily lead to the rise of an optimal signaling system, ...
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作者：van Velzen, Bas; Hamers, Herbert; Solymosi, Tamas
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：Chain-component additive games are graph-restricted superadditive games, where an exogenously given chain determines the cooperative possibilities of the players. These games can model various multi-agent decision situations, such as strictly hierarchical organisations or sequencing/scheduling related problems, where an order of the agents is fixed by some external factor, and with respect to this order only consecutive coalitions can generate added value. In this paper we characterise core st...
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作者：Lahkar, Ratul; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies' current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its rest points coincide with the Nash equilibria of the underlying game. and it converges globally to Nash equilibrium in potential games and in stable games. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Koessler, Frederic
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper studies the effects of analogy-based expectations in static two-player games of incomplete information. Players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy: they bundle states into analogy classes and play best-responses to their opponent's average strategy in those analogy classes. We provide general properties of analogy-based expectation equilibria and apply the model to a variety of well known games. We characterize co...
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作者：Izquierdo, Luis R.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Gotts, Nicholas M.; Polhill, J. Gary
作者单位：Universidad de Burgos; Universidad de Valladolid; James Hutton Institute
摘要：Reinforcement learners tend to repeat actions that led to satisfactory outcomes in the past, and avoid choices that resulted in unsatisfactory experiences. This behavior is one of the most widespread adaptation mechanisms in nature. In this paper we fully characterize the dynamics of one of the best known stochastic models of reinforcement learning [Bush, R., Mosteller, F., 1955. Stochastic Models of Learning. Wiley & Sons, New York] for 2-player 2-strategy games. We also provide some extensio...
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作者：John, Morgan; Vardy, Felix
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the value of commitment in sequential contests when the follower faces small costs to observe the leader's effort. We show that the value of commitment vanishes entirely in this class of games. By contrast, in sequential tournaments-games where, at a cost, the follower can observe the effectiveness of the leader's effort-the value of commitment is preserved completely provided that the observation costs are sufficiently small. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Agastya, Murali; Menezes, Ham; Sengupta, Kunal
作者单位：University of Sydney; University of Queensland
摘要：Rarely, if ever. do parties contemplating a joint project commit resources without engaging in nonbindin- discussions about who does what. To examine the role of such discussions, we model the investment decision as a voluntary contribution game where each player is privately informed of her benefit from project's completion. Efficiency of every equilibrium of this game is improved when a prior stage of communication is allowed. Interestingly, this improvement can be achieved in simple equilib...
