Games and Economic Behavior

最新文章

• Informed principal with correlation AI翻译
  作者：Cella, Michela
  作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca
  摘要：In this paper we analyze an adverse selection model with one principal and one agent, who are both risk neutral and have private information. We assume that the private information of the principal is correlated with that of the agent. The main result of the paper is that the principal can extract a larger share of the surplus from the agent than in the case where her information is public. The principal can design Such a contract because she exploits the fact that her type is an informative s...
• In memoriam: Michael B. Maschler (1927-2008) AI翻译
  作者：Kalai, Ehud
• Case-based learning with different similarity functions AI翻译
  作者：Guerdjikova, Ani
  作者单位：Cornell University
  摘要：The paper applies the rule for adaptation of the aspiration level suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler to a situation in which the similarity between acts is represented by an arbitrary similarity function [Gilboa, I., Schmeidler, D., 1996. Case-based optimization. Games Econ. Behav. 15, 1-26]. I show that the optimality result derived by Gilboa and Schmeidler in general fails. With a concave similarity function, only corner acts are chosen in the limit. The optimality result can tie reestablish...
• Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions AI翻译
  作者：Kirkegaard, Ren; Overgaard, Per Baltzer
  作者单位：Aarhus University; Brock University
  摘要：We consider first-price and second-price auctions with asymmetric buyers, and examine whether pre-auction offers to a subset of buyers are profitable. A single offer is never profitable prior to a second-price auction, but may be profitable prior to a first-price auction. However, a sequence of offers is profitable in either type of auction. In our model, suitably chosen pre-auction offers work because they move the assignment when bidder valuations are near the top closer to the optimal, reve...
• Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles AI翻译
  作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  摘要：In many economic settings, like spectrum and real-estate auctions, geometric figures on the plane are for sale. Each bidder bids for his desired figure, and the auctioneer has to choose a set of disjoint figures that maximizes the social welfare. In this work, we design mechanisms that are both incentive compatible and computationally feasible for these environments. Since the underlying algorithmic problem is computationally hard, these mechanisms cannot always achieve the optimal welfare; Ne...
• Majority rule when voters like to win AI翻译
  作者：Callander, Steven
  作者单位：Northwestern University
  摘要：I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate and to vote for the winner. When voters care only about the winning candidate (the standard formulation) a unique responsive equilibrium exists. The addition of a desire to win creates multiple equilibria, some with unusual properties. In most of these equilibria information is not aggregated effectively, and I uncover the novel possibility of negative information aggregation in which information...
• Fictitious play in 3 x 3 games: The transition between periodic and chaotic behaviour AI翻译
  作者：Sparrow, Colin; van Strien, Sebastian; Harris, Christopher
  作者单位：University of Warwick
  摘要：In the 1960s Shapley provided an example of a two-player fictitious game with periodic behaviour. In this game, player A aims to copy B's behaviour and player B aims to play one ahead of player A. In this paper we generalise Shapley's example by introducing an external parameter. We show that the periodic behaviour in Shapley's example at some critical parameter value disintegrates into unpredictable (chaotic) behaviour, with players dithering a huge number of times between different strategie...
• Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint AI翻译
  作者：Azacis, Helmuts
  作者单位：Cardiff University
  摘要：I consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash an...
• 24. Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs AI翻译
  作者：Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi
  作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Amsterdam
  摘要：Bertrand competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy Nash equilibrium prices. We first present results of experiments in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. More firms lead to lower average prices. However, prices remain substantially above the Walrasian level. With more than two firms the predominant market price is 24, a price not predicted by conventional equilibrium theories. This phenomenon can be captured b...
• Asymmetric evolutionary games with non-linear pure strategy payoffs AI翻译
  作者：Fishman, Michael A.
  摘要：In this paper, I extend the analytical framework of evolutionary game theory to games with two distinct types of players where the type-specific payoff functions are nonlinear on the right-bi-player-type nonlinear (BNL) evolutionary games. That is, asymmetric games where the payoffs for pairwise interactions are influenced by the ambient frequencies of the pertinent strategies of both types of players. While this paper is motivated by my interest in inter- and intra-gender conflicts of interes...