Aversion to norm-breaking:: A model

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Lopez-Perez, Raul
署名单位:
Autonomous University of Madrid
刊物名称:
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN:
0899-8256
DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.009
发表日期:
2008
页码:
237-267
关键词:
emotions fairness path-dependency RECIPROCITY social norms
摘要:
In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) Many subjects cooperate Contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) Subjects often punish those others who behave Unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocity. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.