Adaptation and complexity in repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maenner, Eliot
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 166-187
• 关键词: Repeated games; learning; complexity; bounded rationality

摘要

The paper presents a learning model for two-player infinitely repeated games. In an inference step players construct minimally complex inferences of strategies based on observed play, and in an adaptation step players choose minimally complex best responses to an inference. When players randomly select an inference from a probability distribution with full support the set of steady states is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in which only stage game Nash equilibria are played. When players make 'cautious' inferences the set of steady states is the subset of self-confirming equilibria with Nash outcome paths. When players use different inference rules, the set of steady states can lie between the previous two cases. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.