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作者：Echenique, Federico
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymptotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference relations over individual agents-which has positive implicatio...
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作者：Schotter, Andrew; Sopher, Barry
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; New York University
摘要：In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior...
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作者：Kirchkamp, Oliver; Nagel, Rosemarie
作者单位：University of St Andrews; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and structure, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate parameters of a learning model. We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, may be negligible in the experiment. Naive imitation predicts more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones-regardless ...
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作者：Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Maastricht University
摘要：We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vale's [Roth, A.E., Vande Vate, J.H., 1990. Random paths to s...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor goes to one. Our result covers general stage games including those that fail a full-dimensionality condition that had been imposed in past work. It also provides a characterization of the limit set when the strategies are restricted in a way that endogenously makes the full-dimensionality condition fail, as in the strongly symmetric equi...
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作者：Chang, Chih; Hu, Chcng-Cheng
作者单位：Southern Taiwan University of Science & Technology; National Tsing Hua University
摘要：The initiating points of the current paper are the axiomatic characterizations, in terms of consistency, of the equal allocation of nonseparable cost value (by Moulin), the Shapley value (by Hart and Mas-Colell), and the prenucleolus (by Orshan). The basic axioms are the same, but three different reduced games can be used to distinguish these three solutions. The main purpose of the paper is to illustrate that besides the definitions of reduced games are different, the axiom converse consisten...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad; Segev, Ella; Talley, Eric
作者单位：Open University Israel; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Southern California; RAND Corporation
摘要：This paper explores the interdependence between market structure and an important class of cognitive biases. Starting with a familiar bilateral monopoly framework, we characterize the endogenous emergence of preference distortions during bargaining which cause negotiators to perceive their private valuations differently than they would outside the adversarial negotiation context. Using this model, we then demonstrate how a number of external interventions in the structure and/or organization o...
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作者：Germano, Fabrizio; Lugosi, Gabor
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We construct an Uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player plays according to it, mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The strategy requires very little in terms of information about the game, as players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs. Moreover, in a variant of the procedure, players need not know that there are other players in the game and that payoffs are determined through other players' acti...
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作者：Sun, Yeneng; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider a perfectly competitive ex ante economy with a continuum of agents and negligible asymmetric information. For such an economy we recast the basic classical results on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, core equivalence, and the blocking size of coalitions. Moreover, we examine the incentive compatibility of the ex ante Pareto, core and Walrasian allocations. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Karp, Larry; Lee, In Ho; Mason, Robin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Seoul National University (SNU); University of Southampton
摘要：We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent's payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents' strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action...
