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作者：Sanchez-Pages, Santiago; Vorsatz, Marc
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; Maastricht University
摘要：A recent experimental study of Cai and Wang [Cai, H., Wang, J., 2006. Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games. Games Econ. Behav. 95, 384-394] on strategic information transmission reveals that subjects tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis. To evidence that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in terms of a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying, we show in a simple sender-receiver ...
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作者：Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma
作者单位：University of Toyama; Tokyo Metropolitan University
摘要：We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We derive some simple formulas for limiting stationary distributions for models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy population games. As an application of these formulas, we investigate the robustness of equilibrium selection results to the assumption that the level of noise in agents' choice rules is vanishingly small. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sen, Debapriya; Tauman, Yair
作者单位：Toronto Metropolitan University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties are considered for a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly for both outside and incumbent innovators. It is shown that for any nondrastic innovation (a) the license is practically sold to all firms, ensuring full diffusion of the innovation, (b) consumers are better off, firms are worse off and the social welfare is improved, (c) the optimal licensing policy involves positive royalty for relatively significant innovations, (d) compar...
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作者：Cox, James C.; Friedman, Daniel; Gjerstad, Steven
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences in which my emotional state determines the marginal rate of substitution between my own and others' payoffs, and thus my subsequent choices. In turn, my emotional state responds to relative status and to the kindness or unkindness of others' choices. Structural estimations of this model with six existing data sets demonstrate that other-regarding preferences depend on status, reciprocity, and perceived property rights. (c) 2006 Els...
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作者：Stoltz, Gilles; Lugosi, Gabor
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Hart and Schmeidler's extension of correlated equilibrium to games with infinite sets of strategies is studied. General properties of the set of correlated equilibria are described. It is shown that, just like for finite games, if all players play according to an appropriate regret-minimizing strategy then the empirical frequencies of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria whenever the strategy sets are convex and compact.(c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Montrucchio, Luigi; Scarsini, Marco
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin
摘要：We consider a game, called newsvendor game, where several retailers, who face a random demand, can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf. Profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers. A game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit. We consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors. We prove in great generality results abo...
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作者：Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：A theorem on existence of mixed strategy equilibria in discontinuous zero-sum games is proved and applied to three models of elections. First, the existence theorem yields a mixed strategy equilibrium in the multidimensional spatial model of elections with three voters. A nine-voter example shows that a key condition of the existence theorem is violated for general finite numbers of voters and illustrates an obstacle to a general result. Second, the theorem provides a simple and self-contained...
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作者：Aliprantis, C. D.; Camera, G.; Puzzello, D.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Kentucky; University of Kentucky
摘要：We develop theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching processes. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and study the links between properties of the different processes and trade frictions. A particular emphasis is placed on providing a mapping between matching technologies and informational constraints. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Cassar, Alessandra
作者单位：University of San Francisco
摘要：A laboratory experiment has been designed to study coordination and cooperation in games played on local, random and small-world networks. For the coordination game, the results revealed a tendency for coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in all three networks, but the frequency of payoff-dominant choices was significantly higher in small-world networks than in local and random networks. For the prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation was hard to reach on all three networks, with avera...
