Reputation and impermanent types
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Wiseman, Thomas
署名单位：
University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.002
发表日期：
2008
页码：
190-210
关键词：
摘要：
I consider a version of the chain store game where the incumbent firm's type evolves according to a Markov process with two states: a tough type who always fights entry, and a weak type who prefers to accommodate. There exists a minimal level of persistence necessary for the incumbent to be able to sustain any reputation for being tough. Above that level, as the number of markets T increases, in equilibrium play alternates between intervals of entry by competitors and intervals of deterrence. When T is infinite, then regardless of the discount factor there exists a sequential equilibrium in which entry occurs in a positive fraction of the markets. One interpretation is that reputation is not permanent, but must be renewed occasionally. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.