Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Masso, Jordi; Nicolo, Antonio
• 署名单位: University of Padua; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.007
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 591-611
• 关键词: Public goods; Gregarious preferences; Subgame perfect implementation

摘要

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose in alternative front a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. All allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set Of its users. Agents have gregarious Preferences over allocations: given all allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent call be forced to be a User and no agent who wants to be it User call be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium Outcome is all efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.