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作者：Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio; Sanchez-Rodriguez, Estela
作者单位：Northwestern University; Universidade de Vigo; Universidade de Vigo
摘要：We follow the path initiated by Shapley in 1971 and study the geometry of the core of convex and strictly convex games. We define what we call face games and use them to study the combinatorial complexity of the core of a strictly convex game. Remarkably, we present a picture that summarizes our results with the aid of Pascal's triangle. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Deneckere, Raymond; Severinov, Sergel
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Essex
摘要：We study implementation in environments where agents have limited ability to imitate others. Agents are randomly and privately endowed with type-dependent sets of messages. So sending it message becomes a partial proof regarding type. For environments where agents can send any combination of available messages. we develop an Extended Revelation Principle and characterize the incentive constraints which implementable allocations must satisfy. When not all message combinations are feasible, stat...
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作者：Satterthwaite, Mark; Shneyerov, Artyom
作者单位：Northwestern University; Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers' values for the traded good are private and independently drawn. Time is discrete, each period has length 3, and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market. Within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if tra...
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作者：Chang, Chih; Hu, Cheng-Cheng
作者单位：Southern Taiwan University of Science & Technology; National Tsing Hua University
摘要：First, we propose an axiomatic characterization of the f-just rules. Second, based on the result, a game is designed and a non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules is provided. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Simonsohn, Uri; Karlsson, Niklas; Loewenstein, George; Ariely, Dan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Gothenburg; Carnegie Mellon University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Standard economic models assume that the weight given to information from different sources depends exclusively on its diagnosticity. In this paper we study whether the same piece of information is weighted more heavily simply because it arose from direct experience rather than from observation. We investigate this possibility by conducting repeated game experiments in which groups of players are randomly rematched on every round and receive feedback about the actions and outcomes of all playe...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf
作者单位：Maastricht University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected cycle-free communication graph. Players in the game can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the graph. We introduce a new single-valued solution concept, the average tree solution. Our solution is characterized by component efficiency and component fairness. The interpretation of component fairness is that deleting a link between two players yields for both resulting compone...
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作者：Mu'alem, Ahuva; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment Riles will not ensure truthfulness). We develop a set of techniques that allow constructing efficiently computable truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the special case where each bidder desires a specific known subset of items ...
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作者：Moulin, Herve
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：If shortest (respectively longest) jobs are served first, splitting a job into smaller jobs (respectively merging several jobs) can reduce the actual wait. Any deterministic protocol is vulnerable to strategic splitting and/or merging. This is not true if scheduling is random, and users care only about expected wait. The Proportional rule draws the job served last with probabilities proportional to size, then repeats among the remaining jobs. It is immune to splitting and merging. Among split-...
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作者：Steiner, Jakub
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：Players repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which dec...
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作者：Tchantcho, Bertrand; Lambo, Lawrence Diffo; Pongou, Roland; Engoulou, Bertrand Mbama
作者单位：Brown University; University of Yaounde I
摘要：The influence relation was introduced by Isbell [Isbell, J.R.. 1958. A class of simple games. Duke Math.. 25, 423-439] to qualitatively compare the a priori influence of voters in a simple game, which by construction allows only yes and no votes. We extend this relation to voting games with abstention (VGAs), in which abstention is permitted as an intermediate option between a yes and a no vote. Unlike in simple games, this relation is not a preorder in VGAs in general. It is not complete eith...
