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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We model non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers, assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms' respective products and each firm has private information about its own product's quality. We characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm's price reveals its respective product quality. We show that the equilibrium prices, the difference between those prices, the associated outputs...
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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
作者单位：Middlebury College
摘要：Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders. even at considerable cost. To examine the implications of agents who punish, we simulate an environment populated with behavioral strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is allowed. We test ...
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作者：Benoit, Jean Pierre; Ok, Efe A.; Sanver, M. Rerazi
作者单位：New York University; Istanbul Bilgi University
摘要：We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (f...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division. (C) 2007 E...
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作者：Xu, Yongsheng; Yoshihara, Naoki
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Hitotsubashi University
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作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal-agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that, under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof even when type realizations are serially correlated. When the renegotiation-proofness constraint is binding, it is always optimal to partially screen the types by offering a menu of choices to the agent; and the distortion induced by the ...
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作者：Berger, Ulrich
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：Fictitious Play is the oldest and most studied learning process for games. Since the already classical result for zero-sum games, convergence of beliefs to the set of Nash equilibria has been established for several classes of games, including weighted potential games, supertroodular games with diminishing returns, and 3 x 3 supermodular games. Extending these results, we establish convergence of Continuous-time Fictitious Play for ordinal potential games and quasi-supermodular games with dimi...
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作者：Callandera, Steven; Wilkie, Simon
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Southern California
摘要：Despite a pervasive presence in politics, lying has not traditionally played a role in formal models of elections. In this paper we develop a model that allows candidates in the campaign stage to misrepresent their policy intentions if elected to office, and in which the willingness to lie varies across candidates. We find that candidates more willing to lie are favored, but that this advantage is limited by the electoral mechanism and to such an extent that more honest candidates win a signif...
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作者：Smith, Trenton G.; Tasnadi, Attila
作者单位：Washington State University; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：Economic theories of rational addiction aim to describe consumer behavior in the presence of habit-forming goods. We provide a biological foundation for this body of work by formally specifying conditions under which it is optimal to form a habit. We demonstrate the empirical validity of our thesis with an indepth review and synthesis of the biomedical literature concerning the action of opiates in the mammalian brain and their effects on behavior. Our results lend credence to many of the unco...
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作者：Engelmann, Dirk; Steiner, Jakub
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We consider the effects of risk preferences in mixed-strategy equilibria of 2 x 2 games, provided such equilibria exist. We identify sufficient conditions under which the expected payoff in the mixed equilibrium increases or decreases with the degree of risk aversion. We find that (at least moderate degrees of) risk aversion will frequently be beneficial in mixed equilibria. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
