Efficient communication in the electronic mail game

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: De Jaegher, Kris
• 署名单位: Utrecht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.003
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 468-497
• 关键词: electronic mail game; efficient communication; grounding; Equilibrium refinements; evolutionary stability

摘要

The literature on the electronic mail game shows that players' mutual expectations may lock them into requiring an inefficiently large number of confirmations and confirmations of confirmations from one another. This paper shows that this result hinges on the assumption that, with the exception of the first message, each player can only send a message when receiving an immediately preceding message. We show that, once this assumption is lifted, equilibria involving confirmations of confirmations no longer pass standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium, and are no longer evolutionary stable. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.