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作者：Herves-Beloso, Carlos; Moreno-Garcia, Emma
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; University of Salamanca
摘要：We associate to any pure exchange economy a game with only two players, regardless of the number of consumers. In this two-player game, each player represents a different role of the society, formed by all the individuals in the economy. Player 1 selects feasible allocations trying to make Pareto improvements. Player 2 chooses an alternative from the wider range of allocations that are feasible in the sense of Aubin. The set of Nash equilibria of our game is non-empty and our main result provi...
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作者：Bergin, James; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Queens University - Canada
摘要：This paper characterizes long-run outcomes for broad classes of symmetric games, when players select actions on the basis of average historical performance. Received wisdom suggests that when agent's interests are partially opposed, behavior is excessively competitive: keeping up with the Jones' lowers everyones' welfare. Here, we study the long-run consequences of imitative behavior when agents have sufficiently long memories and evaluate past actions in terms of (weighted) average payoff. Im...
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作者：Penn, Michal; Polukarov, Maria; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Southampton; Microsoft; MICROSOFT ISRAEL
摘要：We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task, We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and a failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we p...
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作者：Calleja, Pedro; Rafels, Carles; Tijs, Stef
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：We introduce the aggregate-monotonic core as the set of allocations of a transferable utility cooperative game attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core-selection and aggregate-monotonicity. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core and the aggregate-monotonic core. Finally, we introduce upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity for set-valued solutions, and characterize the aggregate-monotonic core using core-selection and upper and lower aggre...
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作者：Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Leicester
摘要：This paper explores how the ability to commit in games affect equilibrium payoffs. More precisely, we consider two-stage games, called commitment gaines, in which players can commit to some of their strategies in the first stage, and play the game induced by their commitment in the second stage. We completely characterize equilibrium payoffs of commitment games. Among others, we show that the power to commit in finitely repeated games as, for instance, finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game...
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作者：Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
摘要：To any assignment market we associate the unique exact assignment game defined on the same set of agents and with a core that is a translation of the core of the initial market. As it happens with the core, the kernel and the nucleolus of an assignment game are proved to be the translation of the kernel and the nucleolus of its related exact assignment game by the vector of minimum core payoffs. Agents on each side of the market are classified by means of an equivalence relation and, when agen...
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作者：Ashworth, Scott; de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno
作者单位：University of Chicago; Princeton University
摘要：We study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences (e.g., engage in campaign spending). The marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization-the closer platforms are, the more valence affects the election Outcome. Consequently, candidates without policy preferences choose divergent platforms to soften valence competition. Moreover, exogenous increases in incentives for valence accumulation lead to both increased valence and increased polari...
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作者：Pimienta, Carlos
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：This paper proves the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games: for a generic assignment of utilities to networks, the set of probability distributions on networks induced by Nash equilibria is finite. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bjornerstedt, Jonas; Westermark, Andreas
作者单位：Uppsala University
摘要：This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel and Moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria [Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 1995a. Cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities. Rev. Econ. Stud. 62, 619-637]. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each...
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作者：Dubey, Pradeep; Sondermann, Dieter
作者单位：University of Bonn; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Yale University
摘要：We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walrus) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
