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作者：Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno; Ule, Aljaz
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; California Institute of Technology; Maastricht University
摘要：This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal [Bala, V., Goyal, S., 2000. A non-cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica 68, 1131-1230] model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by introducing agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. Furthermore, agents' types may be common knowledge or private information. In all treatments, the (e...
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作者：Csoka, Peter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Koczy, Laszlo A.
作者单位：Maastricht University; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：The measurement and the allocation of risk are fundamental problems of portfolio management. Coherent measures of risk provide an axiomatic approach to the former problem. In an environment given by a coherent measure of risk and the various portfolios' realization vectors, risk allocation games aim at solving the second problem: How to distribute the diversification benefits of the various portfolios? Understanding these cooperative games helps us to find stable, efficient, and fair allocatio...
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作者：Nash, John F., Jr.
作者单位：Princeton University
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作者：Rauh, Michael T.
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：In this paper, we apply supermodular game theory to the equilibrium search literature with sequential search. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing game to exhibit strategic complementarities and prove existence of equilibrium. We then show that price dispersion is inherently incompatible with strategic complementarities in the sense that the Diamond Paradox obtains when firms are identical and is robust within the class of search cost densities that are small near ze...
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作者：Gorodeisky, Ziv
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider stochastic dynamics for the Matching Pennies game, which behave, in expectation, like the best-response dynamics (i.e., the continuous fictitious play). Since the corresponding vector field is not continuous, we cannot apply the deterministic approximation results of Benaim and Weibull [M. Benaim, W. Weibull. 2003. Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games. Econometrica 71, 873-903]. Nevertheless, we prove such results for our dynamics by developing the notion of...
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作者：Mannor, Shie; Tsitsiklis, John N.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); McGill University
摘要：We consider a finite two-player zero-stun game with vector-valued rewards. We study the question of whether a given polyhedral set D is approachable, that is, whether Player 1 (the decision maker) can guarantee that the long-term average reward belongs to D, for any strategy of Player 2 (the adversary). We examine Blackwell's necessary and sufficient conditions for approachability, and show that the problem of checking these conditions is NP-hard, even in the special case where D is a singleto...
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作者：Conley, John P.; Neilson, William
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We consider a situation in which games are formed endogenously in two senses: (1) there is a pregame in which agents choose to learn I Subset of all feasible strategies and can then employ only these strategies in Subsequent play, and (2) agents choose their game partners through a costly search process. We show that at any subgame perfect equilibrium, agents will constrain their action sets in the pregame in such a way that a single social norm prevails. Thus, all agents in a society will abi...
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作者：Stamatopoulos, Giorgos; Tauman, Tami
作者单位：University of Crete; Columbia University
摘要：It is well known that selling licenses for the use of a cost-reducing innovation by auction yields a higher revenue compared to fixed fee in a symmetric Cournot industry. In this note we show that this result can be reversed in an asymmetric Cournot industry, i.e., the fixed fee policy can generate a strictly higher revenue than the auction policy in an industry where prior to the innovation firms are cost-asymmetric. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper examines the variation in total effort expended by participants when prizes are awarded in a grand contest as opposed to a number of subcontests. When contestants are homogeneous, under a mild and plausible condition (regular contest technology), a grand contest generates more effort than any set of subcontests. When no restrictions are placed on the contest technology, the results further demonstrate an increasing-return-to-scale property such that each individual responds to a pro...
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作者：Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias K.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We investigate the welfare effects of policies that increase voter turnout in costly voting models. In a generalized costly voting model, we show that if the electorate is sufficiently large, then increasing voter turnout is generically efficient. Increasing turnout in small elections is only inefficient if the electorate is evenly divided or if there is already almost complete voter participation. Finally, we argue that the effects underlying our results are robust in a large class of endogen...
