A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.014
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 598-610
• 关键词: Assignment game; Exact game; core; Nucleolus; Glove market

摘要

To any assignment market we associate the unique exact assignment game defined on the same set of agents and with a core that is a translation of the core of the initial market. As it happens with the core, the kernel and the nucleolus of an assignment game are proved to be the translation of the kernel and the nucleolus of its related exact assignment game by the vector of minimum core payoffs. Agents on each side of the market are classified by means of an equivalence relation and, when agents on the same class are ordered to be consecutive, the related exact assignment market is defined by a partitioned matrix, each block of the partition being a glove market. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.