Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dubey, Pradeep; Sondermann, Dieter
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.009
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 124-141
• 关键词: Limit orders; Double auction; Nash equilibria; Walras equilibria; mechanism design

摘要

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walrus) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.