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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study Blackwell's approachability in repeated games with vector payoffs when the approaching player is restricted to use strategies with bounded memory: either strategies with bounded recall, or strategies that can be implemented by finite automata. Our main finding is that the following three statements are equivalent for closed sets, (i) The set is approachable with bounded recall strategies. (ii) The set is approachable with strategies that can be implemented with finite automata. (iii) ...
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作者：Mezzetti, Claudio; Tsetlin, Ilia
作者单位：University of Warwick; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We Study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with affiliated values. We show that the second-price auction minimizes revenue among all efficient auction mechanisms in which only the winner pays, and the price only depends oil the losers' bids. In particular, we show that the kth price auction generates higher revenue than the second-price auction. for all k > 2. If rationing is allowed, with shares of the asset rationed among the t highest bidders, then the (t + 1)st price aucti...
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作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.; Rego, Leandro C.
作者单位：Universidade Federal de Pernambuco; Cornell University; Cornell University
摘要：Awareness has been shown to be a useful addition to standard epistemic logic. However, standard propositional logics for knowledge and awareness cannot express the fact that an agent knows that there are facts of which he is unaware without there being an explicit fact that the agent knows he is unaware of. We extend Fagin and Halpern's logic of general awareness to a logic that allows quantification over variables, so that there is a formula in the language that says an agent explicitly knows...
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作者：De Sinopoli, Francesco; Pimienta, Carlos
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are ill dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium ill undominated strategies. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Grilo, Isabel; Mertens, Jean-Francois
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite de Lille
摘要：In a multi-commodity framework with absence of wealth effects, we prove the existence of equilibrium for Cournot oligopoly, and that the concept is completely non-ambiguous. We also obtain a uniquely defined endogenous inverse demand function, depending only on the competitive sector. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Botelho, Anabela; Harrison, Glenn W.; Costa Pinto, Ligia M.; Rutstrom, Elisabet E.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida; Universidade do Minho
摘要：Game theory Provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters Usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a random strangers design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so sm...
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作者：Lavi, Ron; Swamy, Chaitanya
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Waterloo
摘要：We consider the makespan-minimization problem Oil unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design. No truthful mechanisms with non-trivial approximation guarantees are known for this multidimensional domain. We study a well-motivated special case (also a multidimensional domain), where the processing time of a job on each machine is either low or high. We give a general technique to convert any c-approximation algorithm (in a black-box fashion) to a 3c-approximation truthful-...
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作者：Lim, Wooyoung; Matros, Alexander
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p <= 1 of participating. A unique symmetric equilibrium is found for any n and p and its properties are analyzed. In particular, we show that for a fixed n > 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satisfies a single-crossing property for any two different numbers of potential players. However, total equilibrium spending is monotonically increasing in p and n. We als...
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作者：Suvorov, Anton; van de Ven, Jeroen
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; New Economic School
摘要：This paper Studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. The key aspect is that rewards have informational content. When the principal obtains a private subjective signal about the agent's performance, she may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent. In accordance with the often observed compression of ratings, we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent's interim performance impe...
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作者：Mehta, Aranyak; Roughgarden, Tim; Sundararajan, Mukund
作者单位：Stanford University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：The only known general technique for designing truthful and approximately budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms with good efficiency or computational complexity properties is due to Moulin [1999. Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness. Soc. Choice Welfare 16 (2), 279-320]. For many fundamental cost-sharing applications, however, Moulin mechanisms provably suffer from poor budget-balance, poor economic efficiency, or both. We propose acyclic mechanisms, a n...
