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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Mattozzi, Andrea
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Tulane University
摘要：We analyze the Coordination problem of agents deciding to join a group that uses membership revenues to provide a discrete public good and excludable benefits. The public good and the benefits are jointly produced, so that benefits are valued only if the group succeeds in providing the public good. With asymmetric information about the cost of provision, the static membership game admits a unique equilibrium and we characterize the optimal membership fee. We show that heterogeneity in valuatio...
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作者：Blume, Lawrence E.; Easley, David; Kleinberg, Jon; Tardos, Eva
作者单位：Cornell University; The Santa Fe Institute; Cornell University
摘要：In a wide range of markets, individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries, who determine prices via strategic considerations. Typically, not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries, and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market. We model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers, sellers, and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders...
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作者：Guo, Mingyu; Conitzer, Vincent
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：For allocation problems with one or more items, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (aka Clarke mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction) is efficient, strategy-proof, individually rational, and does not incur a deficit. However, it is not (strongly) budget balanced: generally, the agents' payments Will SLIM to more than 0. We study mechanisms that redistribute some of the VCG payments back to the agents, while maintaining the desirable properties of the VCG mechanism. Our objec...
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作者：Herold, Florian; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-player games. We demonstrate that if nature can choose from a sufficiently general preference space, which includes preferences over outcomes that may depend on the opponent's preference-type, then, in most games, only discriminating preferences (treating different types of opponents differently in the same situation) can be evolutionary stable and some discriminating types are stable in a very ...
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作者：Nowik, Irit
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We offer a new game-theoretical approach to analyze the developmental competition between inotoneurons (motor-neurons) that innervate the same muscle. The size principle-stating that motoneurons with successively higher activation thresholds innervate successively larger portions of muscle-is thought to result from this competition. However, it was not known how. We define a game in which motoneurons compete to innervate a maximal number of muscle-fibers. Their strategies are their activity le...
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作者：Rapoport, Amnon; Kugler, Tamar; Dugar, Subhasish; Gisches, Eyran J.
作者单位：University of Arizona; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Calgary; University of Arizona
摘要：The Braess Paradox consists of showing that, in equilibrium, adding a new link that connects two routes running between a common origin and common destination may raise the travel cost for each network user. We report the results of two experiments designed to study whether the paradox is behaviorally realized in two simulated traffic networks that differ from each other in their topology. Both experiments include relatively large groups of participants who independently and repeatedly choose ...
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作者：Rutstroem, E. Elisabet; Wilcox, Nathaniel T.
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Houston System; University of Houston; State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida
摘要：Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally Verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a two-player repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. Importantly, this effect occurs only during early periods and only for players with strongly asymmetric payoffs, consistent with a cognitive/affective effect on priors that may serve as a substitute for experience. These effects occur with a common scoring rule elicitation procedure...
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作者：Friedman, Daniel; Singh, Nirvikar
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：The efficiency-enhancing role of the vengeance motive is illustrated in a simple social dilemma game in extensive form. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise in random interactions in large groups leads to seven continuous families of (short run) Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) that involve both vengeful and non-vengeful types. A new long run evolutionary equilibrium concept, Evolutionary Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (EPBE), shrinks the equilibrium set to two points. In one ...
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作者：Grosskopf, Brit; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Rights of first refusal are contract clauses intended to provide the holder of a license or lease with some protection when the contract ends. The simplest version gives the right holder the ability to act after potential competitors. However, another common implementation requires the right holder to accept or reject some offers before potential competitors are given the same offer, and, if the right holder rejects the initial offer, allows the right to be exercised affirmatively only if comp...
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作者：Morgan, John; Orzen, Henrik; Sefton, Martin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Nottingham
摘要：This paper presents theory and experiments to investigate how network architecture influences route-choice behavior. We consider changes to networks that, theoretically, exhibit the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes. We show that these paradoxes are specific examples of more general classes of network change properties that we term the least congestible route and size principles, respectively. We find that technical improvements to networks induce adjustments in traffic flows. In the cas...
