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作者：Bhaskar, V.
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper examine,,.,, leader-follower games where a leader must purchase an essential input from a price-setting supplier in order to take an action. We show that equilibrium outcomes when the followers perfectly observe the leaders' actions cannot be approximated by mixed equilibrium outcomes of the game where followers imperfectly observe the leaders' actions, i.e. they are not accessible. Accessibility fails since in a pure strategy equilibrium, a supplier makes positive profits; however ...
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作者：Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Universite Paris 13; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of the independent private values, first-price auction for any distribution of valuations. The equilibrium strategy is a pure strategy at the continuity points of the distribution and bids a mixed strategy at the discontinuity points of the distribution. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Seo, Kyoungwon
作者单位：Boston University; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the demand for flexibility and what it reveals about subjective uncertainty. As in Kreps [D. Kreps, 1979. A representation theorem for 'preference for flexibility'. Econometrica 47, 565-577], Nehring [K. Nehring, 1996. Preference for flexibility and freedom of choice in a Savage framework. UC Davis Working Paper: K. Nehring, 1999. Preference for flexibility in a Savage framework. Econometrica 67, 101-119] and Dekel et al. [E. Dekel, B. Lipman, A. Rustichini, 2001. Representing prefere...
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作者：Norman, Thomas W. L.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m x m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing states that allow Ellison's [Ellison, G., 2000. Basins of attraction, long-run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step ...
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作者：Epstein, Amir; Feldman, Michal; Mansour, Yishay
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A topology is efficient for network games if, for any game over it, every Nash equilibrium is socially optimal. It is well known that many topologies are not efficient for network games. We characterize efficient topologies in network games with a finite set of players, each wishing to transmit an atomic unit of unsplittable flow. We distinguish between two classes of atomic network routing games. In network congestion games a player's cost is the sum of the costs of the edges it traverses, wh...
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作者：Powell, Robert
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The strategic allocation of resources across multiple fronts has long been studied in the context of Blotto games in which two players simultaneously select their allocations. However many allocation problems are sequential. For example, a state trying to defend against a terrorist attack generally allocates some or all of its resources before the attacker decides where to Strike, This paper studies the allocation problem confronting a defender who must decide how to distribute limited resourc...
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作者：Weinstein, Alan; Kuhn, Harold; Goodman, Leo A.; McFadden, Dan; Sobel, Joel; Adler, Ilan; Feldman, Jacob; Alkan, Ahmet; Gale, Katharine; Dunning, Elizabeth; Watkiss, Samara; Gilbert, Roger; Birt, Jonathan; Ingham, Graham; Gilbert, Sandra M.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Princeton University; Sabanci University
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作者：Grimm, Veronika; Mengel, Friederike
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Maastricht University; University of Cologne; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
摘要：We experimentally investigate the effect of population viscosity (an increased probability to interact with others of one's type or group) on cooperation in a standard prisoner's dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups that differ in the defector gain in the associated prisoner's dilemma. Choosing into the group with the smaller defector-gain can signal one's willingness to cooperate. We find that viscosity produces an endogenous sorting of cooperators and defect...
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作者：Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Free University of Berlin
摘要：We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium analytically and demonstrate that it exhibits endogenous uncertainty. Even a large lead by one player does not fully discourage the other pl...
