Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bjornerstedt, Jonas; Westermark, Andreas
• 署名单位: Uppsala University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.012
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 318-338
• 关键词: Bargaining; externalities; delay

摘要

This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel and Moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria [Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 1995a. Cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities. Rev. Econ. Stud. 62, 619-637]. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.