Walrasian analysis via two-player games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herves-Beloso, Carlos; Moreno-Garcia, Emma
• 署名单位: Universidade de Vigo; University of Salamanca
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.001
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 220-233
• 关键词: Walrasian equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; Aubin core

摘要

We associate to any pure exchange economy a game with only two players, regardless of the number of consumers. In this two-player game, each player represents a different role of the society, formed by all the individuals in the economy. Player 1 selects feasible allocations trying to make Pareto improvements. Player 2 chooses an alternative from the wider range of allocations that are feasible in the sense of Aubin. The set of Nash equilibria of our game is non-empty and our main result provides a characterization of Walrasian equilibria allocations as strong Nash equilibria of the associated society game. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.