Cooperation through imitation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergin, James; Bernhardt, Dan
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Queens University - Canada
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.008
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 376-388
• 关键词: Evolutionary games

摘要

This paper characterizes long-run outcomes for broad classes of symmetric games, when players select actions on the basis of average historical performance. Received wisdom suggests that when agent's interests are partially opposed, behavior is excessively competitive: keeping up with the Jones' lowers everyones' welfare. Here, we study the long-run consequences of imitative behavior when agents have sufficiently long memories and evaluate past actions in terms of (weighted) average payoff. Imitation robustly leads to cooperative outcomes (with highest symmetric payoffs) in the long run. Furthermore, lengthening memory reinforces this effect. This provides a rationale, for example, for collusive cartel-like behavior without collusive intent. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.