The aggregate-monotonic core

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calleja, Pedro; Rafels, Carles; Tijs, Stef
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.07.001
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 742-748
• 关键词: Cooperative games; core; Aggregate-monotonicity

摘要

We introduce the aggregate-monotonic core as the set of allocations of a transferable utility cooperative game attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core-selection and aggregate-monotonicity. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core and the aggregate-monotonic core. Finally, we introduce upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity for set-valued solutions, and characterize the aggregate-monotonic core using core-selection and upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.