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作者：Amir, Rabah; Aumann, Robert J.; Peck, James; Wooders, Myrna
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Arizona
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作者：Halbheer, Daniel; Fehr, Ernst; Goette, Lorenz; Schmutzler, Armin
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Zurich; University of Geneva; University of Zurich
摘要：Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in marginal cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. We find that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, bu...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Brown University; University of London; University College London
摘要：When two agents hold different priors over an unverifiable state of nature, which affects the outcome of a game they are about to play, they have an incentive to bet on the game's outcome. We pose the following question: what are the limits to the agents' ability to realize gains from such speculative bets when their priors are private information? We apply a mechanism design approach to this question. We characterize interim-efficient bets and discuss their implementability in terms of the un...
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作者：Shunda, Nicholas
作者单位：University Redlands
摘要：In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. This paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction's reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price. The model both explains why a revenue-maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidder...
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Kleinberg, Robert; Papadimitriou, Christos H.
作者单位：Microsoft; Cornell University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the equilibria of non-atomic congestion games in which there are two types of players: rational players, who seek to minimize their own delay, and malicious players, who seek to maximize the average delay experienced by the rational players. We study the existence of pure and mixed Nash equilibria for these games, and we seek to quantify the impact of the malicious players on the equilibrium. One counterintuitive phenomenon which we demonstrate is the windfall of malice: paradoxically...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Heidhues, Paul; Lafky, Jonathan; Muenster, Johannes; Zhang, Meixia
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Bonn; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Free University of Berlin; Princeton University
摘要：This paper completely characterizes the set of equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there tire at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive bids below the maximum Valuation. In this class, above a threshold Value all bidders bid truthfully on all units. One of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation is below ...
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作者：Ozyurt, Selcuk; Sanver, M. Remzi
作者单位：Istanbul Bilgi University; New York University
摘要：A social choice hyperfunction picks a non-empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. We analyze the manipulability of social choice hyperfunctions. We identify a domain D-lambda of lexicographic orderings which exhibits an impossibility of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type. Moreover, this impossibility is inherited by all well-known superdomains of D-lambda. As most of the standard extension axioms induce superdomains of D-lambda while social choice...
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作者：Page, Frank H., Jr.; Wooders, Myrna
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Warwick
摘要：We introduce a model of network formation whose primitives consist of a feasible set of networks, player preferences, rules of network formation, and a dominance relation on feasible networks. Rules may range from noncooperative, where players may only act unilaterally, to cooperative, where coalitions of players may act in concert. The dominance relation over feasible networks incorporates player preferences, the rules of network formation, and the degree of farsightedness of players. A speci...
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作者：Epstein, Amir; Feldman, Michal; Mansour, Yishay
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study network games in which each player wishes to connect his source and sink, and the cost of each edge is shared among its users either equally (in Fair Connection Games-FCG's) or arbitrarily (in General Connection Games-GCG's). We study the existence and quality of strong equilibria (SE)-strategy profiles from which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members-in these settings. We show that SE always exist in the following games: (1) Single Source and sink FCG's and GCG's. ...
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作者：d'Aspremont, Claude; Ferreira, Rodolphe Dos Santos
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
摘要：For an industry producing a single homogeneous good, we define and characterize the concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parameterized continuum of regimes with varying competitive toughness. This parameterization will appear to be equivalent to the one used in the empirical literature. The Cournot and the competitive outcomes coincide, respectively, with the softest and the toughest oligopolistic equilibrium outcome. The concept offers an alternative to the conjectural variati...
