-
作者：Majumdar, Mukul
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：The paper is a review of some of the themes to which David Gale made lasting contributions. it touches upon a number of the fundamental issues in the Walrasian equilibrium theory (existence, uniqueness and stability), the overlapping generations model (non-optimality and indeterminacy of competitive equilibria), the von Neumann equilibrium (as a turnpike), and in the theory of decentralized intertemporal allocation through competitive prices (efficiency and golden rules, duality and existence ...
-
作者：Gerardi, Dino; McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew
作者单位：Yale University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We investigate how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken. We show that only slight distortions will be necessary when agents' signals are sufficiently accurate or when the number of informed agents become large. We argue that the particular mechanisms analyzed are substant...
-
作者：Peleg, Bezalel; Peters, Hans
作者单位：Maastricht University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model-i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms Of Supports of lotteries-which has a Nash consistent representation. The latter means that there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for ...
-
作者：Pokladnikova, Vlasta; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：It is a common fear in many countries that ideological parties will come to power through elections but will implement extreme policies. Many countries cope with this problem by overriding the election results when such parties are elected. We demonstrate that the alternative approach of containing these parties within the democratic system is more effective. We show that, as the probability of state's intervention in the next elections increases, an ideological party implements a more extreme...
-
作者：Adriani, Fabrizio; Deidda, Luca G.
作者单位：University of London; University of London School Oriental & African Studies (SOAS); University of Sassari
摘要：We analyze trade between a perfectly informed price setting party (seller) and an imperfectly informed price taker (buyer). Differently from most of the literature. we focus on the case in which, under full information, it would be inefficient to trade goods of sufficiently poor quality. We show that the unique equilibrium surviving D1 is characterized by market breakdown, although trade would be mutually beneficial in some state of nature. This occurs independently of the precision of the inf...
-
作者：Sobel, Joel; von Stengel, Bernhard
-
作者：Hofbauer, Josef; Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; University of Vienna; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：Brown and von Neumann introduced a dynamical system that converges to saddle points of zero sum,carries with finitely many strategies. Nash used the mapping underlying these dynamics to prove existence of equilibria in general games. The resulting Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics are a benchmark example for myopic adjustment dynamics that, in contrast to replicator dynamics. allow for innovation, but require less rationality than the best response dynamics. This paper studies the BNN dynamics f...
-
作者：Tsakas, Elias; Voorneveld, Mark
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; University of Gothenburg; Maastricht University; Tilburg University
摘要：We study the target projection dynamic, a model of learning in normal form games. The dynamic is given a microeconomic foundation in terms of myopic optimization under control costs due to a certain status-quo bias. We establish a number of desirable properties of the dynamic: existence, uniqueness and continuity of solution trajectories, Nash stationarity, positive correlation with payoffs, and innovation. Sufficient conditions are provided under which strictly dominated strategies are wiped ...
-
作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Fajardo, Jose
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：We establish the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in general menu games, known to be Sufficient to analyze common agency problems. Our main result states that every menu game satisfying enough continuity properties has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Despite the continuity assumptions that we make, discontinuities naturally arise due to the absence, in general, of continuous optimal choices for the agent. Our approach, then, is based on (and generalizes) the existence theorem of [Simon, ...
-
作者：Andelman, Nir; Feldman, Michal; Mansour, Yishay
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A strong equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy (SPoA) to be the ratio of the worst strong equilibrium to the social optimum.. Differently front the Price of Anarchy (defined as the ratio of the worst Nash Equilibrium to the social optimum), it quantifies the loss incurred from the lack of a central designer in settings that allow for coordination. We study the SPoA in two settings, namely job scheduling and ...
