Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pimienta, Carlos
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.004
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 920-927
• 关键词: NETWORKS; Generic finiteness; Nash equilibrium

摘要

This paper proves the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games: for a generic assignment of utilities to networks, the set of probability distributions on networks induced by Nash equilibria is finite. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.