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作者：Georganas, Sotiris
作者单位：University of London; University of Bonn
摘要：I design and test a simple English auction and two English auctions with resale, but with different informational backgrounds. All three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium. I find, however, that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly. In the two treatments with resale, subjects deviated from both the Nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in English auctions. Subjects tend to overbid, when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus ...
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作者：Laurent-Lucchetti, Jeremy; Leroux, Justin
作者单位：University of Bern; University of Bern; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Implementing a project, like a nationwide nuclear waste disposal, which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to the host is often problematic. In practice revelation issues and redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable agreements. We address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to select It efficient site (the host with the lowest cost) while simultaneously allowing for the in plementation of any individually rational division of the w...
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作者：Guarino, Antonio; Harmgart, Heike; Huck, Steffen
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; European Bank of Reconstructon & Development
摘要：We introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only one of two possible actions is observable to others. Agents make a binary decision in sequence. The order is random and agents are not aware of their own position in the sequence. When called upon, they are only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the observable action before them. This informational structure arises naturally in many applications. Our most important result is that only one type of casc...
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作者：Blanco, Mariana; Engelmann, Dirk; Normann, Hans Theo
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Universidad del Rosario; University of Copenhagen; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Max Planck Society
摘要：We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences inequality aversion using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at...
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作者：Fiedler, Marina; Haruvy, Ernan; Li, Sherry Xin
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Passau
摘要：We conduct a quasi-field experiment in a virtual world environment to investigate the impact of social distance on economic choices. We design trust games with partner selection, in which the proposer chooses between a familiar responder and a stranger with a higher multiplier. When choosing between the two responders, the proposer faces tradeoffs between economic opportunities and social distance. Comparing participants' behaviors to those in a standalone trust game, we find that in the virtu...
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作者：Sano, Ryuji
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper considers some package auctions with known single-minded bidders. A single-minded bidder is interested in a unique bundle of goods and bids only for that bundle. We examine each bidder's incentive in Ausubel and Milgrom's (2002) ascending proxy auction and every bidder-optimal core-selecting auction. We provide a simple condition for each bidder to report his valuation truthfully, which can be expressed in a single sentence any rival of my rivals is my rival. The Vickrey outcome lie...
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作者：Ivanov, Asen
作者单位：Virginia Commonwealth University
摘要：Based on an experiment in the lab, we classify behavior in one-shot normal-form games along three important dimensions. The first dimension, which is of main interest, is about whether subjects are ambiguity-loving, ambiguity-neutral, or ambiguity-averse. The second dimension is about whether subjects are risk-loving, risk-neutral, or risk-averse. The third dimension is about whether subjects are naive or strategic. Our main result is that, in our main treatment, 32/46/22 percent of subjects a...
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作者：Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz, F.; Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles
作者单位：University of Barcelona
摘要：In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a finite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a characterization of the minimal elements. A sufficient condition under which the join-semilattice reduc...
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作者：de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：In this paper, I study the effects of overconfidence on incentive contracts in a moral-hazard framework. Agent overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract. On the one hand, an optimistic or overconfident agent disproportionately values success-contingent payments, and thus prefers higher-powered incentives. On the other hand, if the agent overestimates the extent to which his actions affect outcomes, lower-powered incentives are sufficient to induce any given effort...
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作者：Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the bidders' incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskin's (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
