Aggregate information cascades

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guarino, Antonio; Harmgart, Heike; Huck, Steffen
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; European Bank of Reconstructon & Development
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.003
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 167-185
• 关键词: Social learning; information cascades; information aggregation; Herd behavior

摘要

We introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only one of two possible actions is observable to others. Agents make a binary decision in sequence. The order is random and agents are not aware of their own position in the sequence. When called upon, they are only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the observable action before them. This informational structure arises naturally in many applications. Our most important result is that only one type of cascade arises in equilibrium, the aggregate cascade on the observable action. A cascade on the unobservable action never arises. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.