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作者：Dominiak, Adam; Duersch, Peter; Lefort, Jean-Philippe
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：Many theories of updating under ambiguity assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism to underpin behaviorally the link between conditional and unconditional preferences. To test the descriptive validity of these rationality concepts, we conduct a dynamic extension of Ellsberg's 3-color experiment. We find that more subjects act in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency and that this result is even stronger among ambiguity averse subjects. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All...
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作者：Spiliopoulos, Leonidas
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games the absence of empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. Weighted fictitious play is extended to detect two-period patterns in opponents' behavior and to comply with the cognitive laws of subjective perception. An analysis of the data from Nyarko and Schotter (2002) uncovers significant evidence of pattern recognition in elicited beliefs and action choices. The probability t...
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作者：Zhao, Rui R.
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：Renegotiation and conflict resolution are studied in relational contracting under subjective evaluation. Renegotiation has three effects. First, it makes the incentive pay scheme low powered: the maximum variation of compensation across performance levels is compressed and the contract is less extreme compared to the case without renegotiation. This effect is stronger when the players are less patient. Second, renegotiation typically renders termination impossible; the contract relies on a low...
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作者：Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; University of Copenhagen; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Maastricht University
摘要：We present a striking example of the deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly. In line with previous experiments we show in a one-shot setting that the allegedly robust false consensus effect disappears if representative information is readily available. But the effect reappears if a small cognitive effort is required to retrieve the information. Most subjects apparently ignore valuable information if it is not handed to them on a silver platter. We conclude that the relevance of the fa...
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作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; Mollerstrom, Johanna; Munkhammar, Sara
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Harvard University
摘要：In an otherwise neutrally described Prisoners' dilemma experiment, we document that behavior is more likely to be cooperative when the game is called the Community Game than when it is called the Stock Market Game. However, the difference vanishes when only one of the subjects is in control of her action. The social framing effect also vanishes when the game is played sequentially. These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Community label triggers a desire to cooperate, but ...
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作者：Kumano, Taro; Watabe, Masahiro
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Zirve University
摘要：Most priority-based assignment problems are solved using the deferred acceptance algorithm. Kojima (2010) shows that stability and nonbossiness are incompatible. We show that the deferred acceptance algorithm satisfies a weaker notion of nonbossiness for every substitutable priority structure. We also discuss the multiplicity of dominant strategy equilibria of the preference revelation game induced by the deferred acceptance algorithm. We show that even untruthful dominant strategy equilibria ...
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作者：Dutta, Bhaskar; Mishra, Debasis
作者单位：University of Warwick; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms representing incentive and fairness properties. We show that while some results are similar, there are ...
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作者：Okada, Akira
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient. (C) 2...
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作者：Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that subjects will choose the payoff dominated game (representing a bad explicit contract), because this game better sustains (implicit) relational incentives backed by either reputational or reciprocity consider...
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作者：Hellman, Ziv
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Extending to infinite state spaces that are compact metric spaces a result previously attained by D. Samet solely in the context of finite state spaces, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior for several players is given in terms of the players' present beliefs only. A common prior exists if and only if for each random variable it is common knowledge that all Cesaro means of iterated expectations with respect to any permutation converge to the same value; this...
