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作者：Cubitt, Robin P.; Sugden, Robert
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of East Anglia
摘要：This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite non-cooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding the conceptual problems associated with iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. It uses a sequence of accumulation and deletion operations to categorise strategies as permissible and impermi...
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作者：Granot, Daniel; Hamers, Herbert; Kuipers, Jeroen; Maschler, Michael
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Tilburg University; Maastricht University
摘要：We study the extended Chinese postman (CP) cooperative game induced by a connected, weighted, undirected graph G. wherein a postman, starting from a post office location, needs to traverse all edges wherein players reside, before returning to the post-office. We characterize the graphs associated with all CP games in which the players on a road pay exactly the cost of the road at each core point, regardless of the number of players residing on the road, the location of the post-office and the ...
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作者：Mitra, Manipushpak; Mutuswami, Suresh
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; University of Leicester
摘要：We identify and characterize a natural and intuitive class of mechanisms called the k-pivotal mechanisms. The axioms used are efficiency, pairwise strategyproofness, equal treatment of equals and weak linearity. We also identify the subclass of these mechanisms which do not run a budget deficit at all profiles and the mechanism which runs the least budget surplus. We also show that while k-pivotal mechanisms are also weak group strategyproof, strong group strategyproofness and efficiency are i...
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作者：Stein, Noah D.; Parrilo, Pablo A.; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of departure functions. We use these characterizations to construct effective algorithms for approximating a single correlated equilibrium or the entire set of correlated equilibria of a game with polynomial utility functions. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Izmalkov, Sergei; Lepinski, Matt; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); RTX Corporation; Raytheon BBN Technologies; New Economic School
摘要：Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator may fail to reach the mechanism's objectives. We thus investigate implementations of a new type. We put forward the notion of a perfect implementation of a normal-form mechanism M: in essence, a concrete extensive-form mechanism...
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作者：Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe; Rutter, Tom
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：We consider a multi-game interactive learning environment in which subjects sometimes only have access to the aggregate distribution of play of the opponents over the various games and sometimes are told the joint distribution of actions and games in a more or less accessible way. Our main findings are: 1) In the presence of feedback spillover, long run behaviors stabilize to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005). 2) Faced with the same objective feedback, the long run behavi...
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作者：Jiang, Albert Xin; Leyton-Brown, Kevin; Bhat, Navin A. R.
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Toronto
摘要：Representing and reasoning with games becomes difficult once they involve large numbers of actions and players, because the space requirement for utility functions can grow unmanageably. Action-Graph Games (AGGs) are a fully-expressive game representation that can compactly express utility functions with structure such as context-specific independence, anonymity, and additivity. We show that AGGs can be used to compactly represent all games that are compact when represented as graphical games,...
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作者：Cardona, Daniel; Ponsati, Clara
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Universitat de les Illes Balears; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferences represented by continuous, concave and single-peaked utility functions, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterizati...
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作者：Eguia, Jon X.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous party formation, I find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc, two blo...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A.; Maasland, Emiel
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Vienna; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders impose strong negative externalities upon each other. In this note, we argue that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any publicly observable payment they would like to make. These payments, so-called flexible entry fees, do not affect the allocation decisi...
