A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blanco, Mariana; Engelmann, Dirk; Normann, Hans Theo
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; Universidad del Rosario; University of Copenhagen; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.008
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 321-338
• 关键词: Behavioral economics; Experimental economics; inequality aversion; other-regarding preferences

摘要

We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences inequality aversion using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at the aggregate level but performs less well at the individual level. The model seems to capture various behavioral motives in different games but the correlation of these motives is low within subjects. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.