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作者：Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Lehigh University
摘要：We report findings from experiments on two delegation-communication games. An uninformed principal chooses whether to fully delegate her decision-making authority to an informed agent or to retain the authority and communicate with the agent via cheap talk to obtain decision-relevant information. In the game in which the delegation outcome is payoff-dominated by both the truthful and the babbling communication outcomes, we find that principal-subjects almost always retain their authority and a...
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作者：Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：University of Warwick; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of partially honest individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truthtelling does not lead to a worse outcome than that which obtains when lying. We show that when there are at least three individuals, all social choice correspondences satisfying No Veto Power can be implemented. If all individuals are partially honest and if the domain is separable, then...
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作者：Dietrich, Franz
作者单位：Universite Paris Cite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of East Anglia
摘要：Economic models describe individuals by underlying characteristics, such as the degree to which they like music, have sympathy, want success, need recognition, etc. In reality, such characteristics change through experiences: taste for Mozart changes through attending concerts, sympathy through meeting people, etc. Models typically ignore change, partly because it is unclear how to incorporate it. I develop a general axiomatic framework for defining, analysing and comparing rival models of cha...
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作者：Newton, Jonathan
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：This paper takes the idea of coalitional behavior - groups of people occasionally acting together to their mutual benefit - and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. An equilibrium selection criterion is defined which we call coalitional stochastic stability (CSS). This differs from existing work on stochastic stability in that profitable coalitional deviations are given greater importance than unprofitable single player d...
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作者：Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz
作者单位：Utrecht University; Radboud University Nijmegen
摘要：This paper experimentally analyzes the effect of network structures on individuals' decisions in a game of strategic substitutes. The theoretical basis for our experiment is the model of Bramoulle and Kranton (2007). As predicted, we find that individuals are able to coordinate on equilibria, but that coordination strongly depends on the network structure. Despite frequent coordination failures, in graphs of size N = 4 equilibrium play seems easier on network architectures with high (low) dens...
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作者：Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：In this paper, we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characterization is based on minimal covers of the grand coalition and associated inequalities. The second characterization shows the relation between the bases that provide core elements of the game and the bases that provide core elements of the games that are obtained from the original one by increasing the value of the grand coalition. The third characterization is based on the idea that if a base of ...
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作者：Oyarzun, Carlos; Sarin, Rajiv
作者单位：University of Birmingham; University of Queensland
摘要：Decision makers are often described as seeking higher expected payoffs and avoiding higher variance in payoffs. We provide some necessary and some sufficient conditions for learning rules, that assume the agent has little prior and feedback information about the environment, to reflect such preferences. We adopt the framework of Borgers, Morales and Sarin (2004, Econometrica) who provide similar results for learning rules that seek higher expected payoffs. Our analysis reveals that a concern f...
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作者：Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca
作者单位：University of Queensland; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：This paper shows how to maximize revenue when a contest is noisy. We consider a case where two or more contestants bid for a prize in a stochastic contest where all bidders value the prize equally. We show that, whenever a Tullock contest yields under-dissipation, the auctioneer's revenue can be increased by optimally fixing the number of tickets. In particular, in a stochastic contest with proportional probabilities, it is possible to obtain (almost) full rent dissipation. We test this hypoth...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.; Ravi, R.; Sayedi, Amin
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：In a setup where a divisible good is to be allocated to a set of bidders with budget constraints, we introduce a mechanism in the spirit of the Vickrey auction. In the mechanism we propose, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since the revenue is increasing in budgets and values, all kinds of equilibrium deviations from true valuations turn out to be beneficial to the auctioneer. We also show that ex-post Nash equilibrium of our mechanism is near Pareto optimal in the sense tha...
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作者：Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information gathering. We develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers, who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation in the auction. We first demonstrate that the optimal mal monopoly price is always lower than the standard monopoly price. We then show that standard auctions with a rese...
