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作者：Perea, Andres
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：Proper rationalizability (Schuhmacher, 1999; Asheim, 2001) is a concept in epistemic game theory based on the following two conditions: (a) a player should be cautious, that is, should not exclude any opponent's strategy from consideration; and (b) a player should respect the opponents' preferences, that is, should deem an opponent's strategy s(i) infinitely more likely than s(i)' if he believes the opponent to prefer s(i) to s(i)'. A strategy is properly rationalizable if it can optimally be ...
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作者：Shneyerov, Artyom; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Princeton University; Harvard University
摘要：Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matc...
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作者：Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Molis, Elena
作者单位：University of Granada; Universidad Publica de Navarra
摘要：There is a wide range of economic problems that involve the exchange of indivisible goods with no monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper by Shapley and Scarf (1974) to problems such as the kidney exchange or the school choice problem. The classical solution to many of these models is to apply a mechanism called Top Trading Cycles, attributed to David Gale, which satisfies good properties for the case of strict preferences. In this paper, we propose a fa...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Rustichini, Aldo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study experimentally how males and females differ in the way same-gender peers observing their action affects their social behavior. In our experiment, people play a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a partisan audience watching the choice. Two groups participated in each session; these groups could be both all-male, both all-female, or one all-male and one all-female. Groups were separated into two rooms. Each person in the group played the game once with an audience of the same group and once ...
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作者：Cassar, Alessandra; Rigdon, Mary
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of San Francisco
摘要：This paper focuses on the interaction between network structure, the role of information, and the level of trust and trustworthiness in 3-node networks. We extend the investment game with one Sender and one Receiver to networked versions - one characterized by one Sender and two Receivers ([1S-2R]) and one characterized by two Senders and one Receiver ([2S-1R]) - under two information conditions, full and partial. We develop a comparative model of trust for the networked exchange environments ...
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作者：Voorneveld, Mark
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：In the dynamic game we analyze, players are the members of a fixed network. Everyone is initially endowed with an information item that he is the only player to hold. Players are offered a finite number of periods to centralize the initially dispersed items in the hands of any one member of the network. In every period, each agent strategically chooses whether or not to transmit the items he holds to his neighbors in the network. The sooner all the items are gathered by any individual, the bet...
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作者：Bulo, Samuel Rota; Bomze, Immanuel M.
作者单位：University of Vienna; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：Building upon a central paradigm of evolutionary game theory, namely the invasion barrier, we propose the new Infection and Immunization Dynamics (INFIMMDYN), modelling a plausible adaptation process in a large population. For general games, this yields a novel refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept based on dynamical arguments, close in spirit to Nash's original mass action idea in his Ph.D. thesis. For partnership games, INFIMMDYN exhibits a better asymptotic behavior compared to other p...
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作者：Comino, Stefano; Manenti, Fabio M.; Nicolo, Antonio
作者单位：University of Udine; University of Padua
摘要：The theoretical literature on the cumulative innovation process has emphasized the role of ex-ante licensing - namely, licensing agreements negotiated before the follow-on innovator has sunk its R&D investment - in mitigating the risk of hold-up of future innovations. In this paper, we consider a patent-holder and a follow-on innovator bargaining over the licensing terms in a context where the former firm is unable to observe the timing of the R&D investment of the latter. We show that the pos...
