Assignment markets with the same core

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz, F.; Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.011
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 553-563
• 关键词: Assignment game; core; Semilattice

摘要

In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a finite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a characterization of the minimal elements. A sufficient condition under which the join-semilattice reduces to a lattice is also given. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.