English auctions with resale: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Georganas, Sotiris
• 署名单位: University of London; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.005
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 147-166
• 关键词: Auctions with resale; experiment; bounded rationality; QRE; Level k

摘要

I design and test a simple English auction and two English auctions with resale, but with different informational backgrounds. All three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium. I find, however, that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly. In the two treatments with resale, subjects deviated from both the Nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in English auctions. Subjects tend to overbid, when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market. I employ different models like QRE and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants, that is, as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors. When the outcome of the resale market is not certain, there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the Nash prediction. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.