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作者：Aragones, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Cyprus
摘要：This paper characterizes a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We show that if voters' utility functions are concave and the median voter ideal point is drawn from a unimodal distribution, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where the advantaged candidate chooses the ideal point o...
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作者：Milchtaich, Igal
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other players' payoffs or, more generally, on some social payoff that depends on everyone's actions. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. As it turns out, even in a symmetric interaction the equilibrium level of social payoff may be lower for a group of altruists than for selfish or spiteful groups. In particular, a concern for others' pa...
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作者：Roy, Sunanda; Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：University of Kansas; Iowa State University
摘要：In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best-response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence of every adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, in GSS, global stability can be analyzed using a single best response dynamic. Moreover, in GSS, global stability is equivalent to dominance solvability, showing that in this class of games, two different foundations for robustne...
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作者：Elmaghraby, Wedad J.; Larson, Nathan
作者单位：University of Virginia; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Bidders often face avoidable fixed costs or other synergies that can make bidding decisions complex and risky, and market outcomes volatile. If bidders deviate from risk neutral best responses, either due to faulty optimization or a preference to avoid volatility, then equilibrium predictions can perform poorly. In this paper, we confront laboratory bidders with three auction formats that make bidding difficult in different ways. We find that measures of 'difficulty' provide a consistent expla...
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作者：Marden, Jason R.; Shamma, Jeff S.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：Log-linear learning is a learning algorithm that provides guarantees on the percentage of time that the action profile will be at a potential maximizer in potential games. The traditional analysis of log-linear learning focuses on explicitly computing the stationary distribution and hence requires a highly structured environment. Since the appeal of log-linear learning is not solely the explicit form of the stationary distribution, we seek to address to what degree one can relax the structural...
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作者：Hoffmann, Magnus; Rota-Graziosi, Gregoire
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin; International Monetary Fund; Universite Clermont Auvergne (UCA)
摘要：We examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two-player contest. The timing of moves, determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following: (1) Players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the extended game. (2) The SPE does not need to be unique...
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作者：Dasgupta, Amil; Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：University of Toronto; Northwestern University
摘要：We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest irreversibly in a project whose success depends on its quality and the timing of investment. Players gradually learn about project quality. We identify conditions on temporal incentives under which, in sufficiently long games, players coordinate on investing whenever doing so is not dominated. Roughly speaking, this outcome occurs whenever players' payoffs are sufficiently tolerant of...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Solan, Eilon; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hommes, Cars H.; Ochea, Marius I.
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Tilburg University
摘要：This note shows, by means of two simple, three-strategy games, the existence of stable periodic orbits and of multiple, interior steady states in a smooth version of the Best-Response Dynamics, the Logit Dynamics. The main finding is that, unlike Replicator Dynamics, generic Hopf bifurcation and thus, stable limit cycles, occur under the Logit Dynamics, even for three-strategy games. We also show that the Logit Dynamics displays another bifurcation which cannot occur under the Replicator Dynam...
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作者：Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule imitate-if-better can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a money pump. In particular, imitation is subject to a money pump if and only if the relative payoff function of the game is of the rock-scissors-paper variety. We also show that a sufficient condition for imi...
