Choosing and sharing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laurent-Lucchetti, Jeremy; Leroux, Justin
• 署名单位: University of Bern; University of Bern; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.002
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 296-300
• 关键词: Public goods; Local externalities; NIMBY; implementation; mechanism design; VCG mechanisms; Divide and choose

摘要

Implementing a project, like a nationwide nuclear waste disposal, which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to the host is often problematic. In practice revelation issues and redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable agreements. We address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to select It efficient site (the host with the lowest cost) while simultaneously allowing for the in plementation of any individually rational division of the whole hosting cost. The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of our simple mechanism are efficient, budget-balanced and individually rational. Moreover, the truthful equilibrium is immune to coalitional deviations. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.