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作者：Bag, Parimal Kanti; Saha, Bibhas
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of East Anglia
摘要：Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the 'lemons' (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits bu...
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作者：Lippert, Steffen; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
作者单位：Massey University; University of Auckland; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study networks of relations - groups of agents linked by several cooperative relationships - exploring equilibrium conditions under different network configurations and information structures. Relationships are the links through which soft information can flow, and the value of a network lies in its ability to enforce agreements that could not be sustained without the information and sanctioning power provided by other network members. The model explains why network closure is important; wh...
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作者：Schmutzler, Armin
摘要：The paper shows that several game-theoretic solution concepts provide similar comparative statics predictions over a wide class of games. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, behavior is affected by parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural approach, using properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing differences. I show that the approach is consistent with general comparative sta...
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作者：Masso, Jordi; de Barreda, Ines Moreno
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strateg...
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作者：Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study a private-values buyer-seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad de Malaga; Universidad de Malaga
摘要：When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet winners) always exist. Moreover, they coincide with the median(s) of the voters' most preferred alternatives. This important fact is known as the median voter result. Variants of it also apply when single-peakedness fails, but preferences verify other domain restrictions, such as single-crossing, intermediateness or order restriction. Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) also proved that t...
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作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that direction benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that ...
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作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Gaechter, Simon; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
作者单位：University of Nottingham; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Bonn; University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg
摘要：Psychological game theory can provide rational-choice-based framing effects; frames influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivations. We explain this theoretically and explore empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2 x 2 design of one-shot public good games we show that frames affect subject's first- and second-order beliefs and contributions. From a psychological game-theoretic framework we derive two mutually compatible hypotheses about guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributi...
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作者：Anshelevich, Elliot; Shepherd, F. B.; Wilfong, Gordon
作者单位：Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; McGill University; AT&T
摘要：We introduce a game theoretic model of network formation in an effort to understand the complex system of business relationships between various Internet entities (e.g., Autonomous Systems, enterprise networks, residential customers). In our model we are given a network topology of nodes and links where the nodes act as the players of the game, and links represent potential contracts. Nodes wish to satisfy their demands, which earn potential revenues, but may have to pay their neighbors for li...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Du, Ninghua; Yang, Chun-Lei
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：Trust is an essential component of good social outcomes and effective economic performance. Reputation on the trustee's past behavior in the same role has proven to be greatly effective at raising the level of trust. In this study, we show that providing information on the trustee's past behavior as the trustor is equally effective as a reputation system. In fact, people still find it worthwhile to invest in a reputation as a trusting person, even though the immediate payoff for trusting is po...
