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作者：Walker, Mark; Wooders, John; Amir, Rabah
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：We study two-person extensive form games, or matches, in which the only possible outcomes (if the game terminates) are that one player or the other is declared the winner. The winner of the match is determined by the winning of points, in point games. We call these matches binary Markov games. We show that if a simple monotonicity condition is satisfied, then (a) it is a Nash equilibrium of the match for the players, at each point, to play a Nash equilibrium of the point game; (b) it is a mini...
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作者：Carrillo, Juan D.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Southern California
摘要：We investigate a common value bilateral bargaining model with two-sided private information and no aggregate uncertainty. A seller owns an asset whose common valuation is a deterministic function of the two traders' private signals. We first establish a notrade theorem for this environment, and proceed to study the effect of the asset valuation structure and the trading mechanism on extent to which asymmetric information induces individuals to engage in mutually unprofitable exchange. A labora...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：New York University; Brown University
摘要：Framing effects have a significant influence on the finitely repeated matching pennies game. The combination of being labelled a guesser, and having the objective of matching the opponent's action, appears to be advantageous. We find that being a player who aims to match the opponent's action is advantageous irrespective of whether the player moves first or second. We examine alternative explanations for our results and relate them to Edgar Allan Poe's The Purloined Letter. We propose a behavi...
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作者：Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Inigo; Ponti, Giovanni; Tomas, Josefa; Ubeda, Luis
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：This paper studies, both theoretically and experimentally, framing effects in the context of a public good game in which players have to make a costly contribution either (i) to achieve or (ii) not to lose a non-excludable monetary prize. Our protocol leads to public good provision (not deterioration) only if a certain contribution level is achieved. Since both frames differ with respect to the reference point, we apply Prospect Theory to derive testable predictions. In particular, Prospect Th...
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作者：Moulin, Herve; Laigret, Francois
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：We propose a simple division of the costs of non-rival resources, when a user's need can be met by different subsets of the resources, and no resource is redundant. Our method is characterized by the Stand Alone core property, additivity in costs, and a symmetry requirement. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A stochastic myopic best-reply dynamics is said to have property (W), for a given number of players n, if every pure weakly dominated strategy in every n-player game is eliminated in the long-run distribution of play induced by the dynamics. In this paper I give a necessary and sufficient condition that a dynamics has to satisfy in order for it to have property (W). The key determinant is found to be the sensitivity of the learning-rate to small payoff differences, inherent in the dynamics. If...
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作者：Young, H. Peyton
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：John Nash's work laid the foundations for evolutionary game theory as well as the theory of games with rational agents. The Nash bargaining solution emerges as a natural solution concept in both of these settings. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Brown University
摘要：We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses or best-responses. First, we show that a necessary condition for recurrent implementation in better-response dynamics (BRD) is a small variation of Maskin monotonicity, which we call quasimonotonicity. We also provide a mechanism for implementation in BRD if the rule is quasimonotonic and excludes worst alternatives - no worst alternative ...
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作者：Chien, Steve; Sinclair, Alistair
作者单位：Microsoft; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the ability of decentralized, local dynamics in non-cooperative games to rapidly reach an approximate (pure) Nash equilibrium. Our main result states that for symmetric congestion games in which the cost function associated with each resource satisfies a bounded jump condition, convergence to an epsilon-Nash equilibrium occurs within a number of steps that is polynomial in the number of players and epsilon(-1). We show moreover that this result holds under a variety of conventions gov...
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作者：Hougaard, Jens Leth; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen
摘要：This paper considers the problem of maximizing social welfare subject to participation constraints. It is shown that for an income allocation method that maximizes a social welfare function there is a monotonic relationship between the incomes allocated to individual agents in a given coalition (with at least three members) and its participation constraint if and only if the aggregate income to that coalition is always maximized. An impossibility result demonstrates that there is no welfare ma...
