Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sano, Ryuji
• 署名单位: University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.003
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 602-606
• 关键词: Package auction; Core-selecting auction; Ascending proxy auction; Single-minded bidder

摘要

This paper considers some package auctions with known single-minded bidders. A single-minded bidder is interested in a unique bundle of goods and bids only for that bundle. We examine each bidder's incentive in Ausubel and Milgrom's (2002) ascending proxy auction and every bidder-optimal core-selecting auction. We provide a simple condition for each bidder to report his valuation truthfully, which can be expressed in a single sentence any rival of my rivals is my rival. The Vickrey outcome lies in the core if and only if this condition holds for every bidder: however, it is rarely satisfied. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.