Second best efficiency and the English auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 496-506
• 关键词: Efficiency; auctions; mechanism design

摘要

We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the bidders' incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskin's (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.