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作者：Antler, Yair; Bachi, Benjamin
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa
摘要：We study a model of two-sided search in which agents' strategic reasoning is coarse. In equilibrium, the most desirable agents behave as if they were fully rational, while for all other agents, coarse reasoning results in overoptimism with regard to their prospects in the market. Consequently, they search longer than is optimal. Moreover, agents with intermediate match values may search indefinitely while all other agents eventually marry. We show that the share of eternal singles converges mo...
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作者：Gieczewski, German
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：I study a dynamic model of electoral competition between candidates with heterogeneous valence. When the candidates' and voters' policy preferences differ, the winner extracts rents, limited only by the voters' threat of electing the weaker candidate. This threat becomes more costly to the voters when the relevant time horizon is longer. Thus, term limits can increase the voters' bargaining power and their welfare. Term limits are even more important for curbing rent extraction if entry is str...
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作者：Nagy, David Krisztian
作者单位：Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：I study how trade affects urbanization and real income. To this end, I exploit large-scale exogenous changes in trade stemming from the redrawing of Hungary's borders after the First World War. I show that urbanization in counties near the new border decreased significantly relative to counties farther away. I rationalize this reduced-form finding in a spatial model in which benefits from trading drive agglomeration around locations where trading activity takes place. Structurally estimating t...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We develop a tractable, dynamic, and strategic model of many-to-many matching with payoff externalities across links. The joint dynamic surplus or certain second properties of individual utilities, like pay-off externalities, can typically be identified. We characterize a class of interior equilibria as solutions to an optimization problem with an objective function that consists of welfare minus an inefficiency loss term. In equilibrium, too few matches are formed. We compare trans-ferable an...
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作者：Schiffer, Burkhard C.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We show there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be evolutionary stable, or that could learn itself Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach a learning opponent to secure at least the Stackelberg leader payoff This observation holds even when we restrict to generic games, two-player games, potential games, games with strategic complements, or 2 x 2 games, in which learning is kno...
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作者：Terstiege, Stefan; Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Basel
摘要：We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally designed auctions. In a single-object auction environment, we assume that before the revenue-maximizing auctioneer designs the auction, bidders noncooperatively choose signal structures that disclose information about their valuations. We show that an equilibrium exists in this two-stage game and that in every equilibrium the object is sold with probability one. Our main result concerns the consequen...
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作者：Cumbul, Eray
作者单位：TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University
摘要：We study quadratic payoff common-value sequential-move aggregative games with signaling. Applications include Stackelberg quantity-setting, public good contribution, common resource, gas emission, and manufacturer-retailer games. Whereas efficient aggregation of information occurs in large Stackelberg markets, it does not occur in the four remaining large markets. If all agents share their information with their followers, expected welfare increases in the Stackelberg and supply chain games an...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Rozen, Kareen
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We experimentally investigate how impartial observers allocate money to agents whose complernentarity and substitutability determine the surplus that each group can achieve. Analyzing the data through the lens of axioms and solutions from cooperative game theory, a one-parameter model (mixing equal split and Shapley value) arises as a parsimonious description of the data.
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作者：Ederer, Florian; Schneider, Frederic
作者单位：Yale University; University of Birmingham
摘要：Using a large-scale hybrid laboratory and online trust experiment with and without preplay communication, we investigate how the passage of time affects trust. Communication (predominantly through promises) raises cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness by about 50 percent. This result holds even when three weeks pass between the time of the trustee's message/the trustor's decision to trust and the time of the trustee's contribution choice and even when this contribution choice is made outside...
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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Kim, Byung-Cheol; Menicucci, Domenico
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Florence
摘要：We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The incentive constraints of the agents on the value creation side may be in conflict with internalizing externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal. Even without such conflict between the two sides, pooling may be optimal due to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agents diverge from those of the average agents on the value capture side. We perform a welfa...
