Term Limits and Bargaining Power in Electoral Competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gieczewski, German
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180033
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1-34
• 关键词: challenger entry; incumbency; Reelection; ELECTIONS; selection; POLICY; performance; QUALITY

摘要

I study a dynamic model of electoral competition between candidates with heterogeneous valence. When the candidates' and voters' policy preferences differ, the winner extracts rents, limited only by the voters' threat of electing the weaker candidate. This threat becomes more costly to the voters when the relevant time horizon is longer. Thus, term limits can increase the voters' bargaining power and their welfare. Term limits are even more important for curbing rent extraction if entry is strategic, as in that case strong incumbents face weaker competition. The paper also compares the welfare properties of seniority caps and stochastic term limits.