Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Terstiege, Stefan; Wasser, Cedric
署名单位：
Maastricht University; University of Basel
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.20200027
发表日期：
2022
页码：
622-664
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze how voluntary disclosure of information by bidders affects the outcome of optimally designed auctions. In a single-object auction environment, we assume that before the revenue-maximizing auctioneer designs the auction, bidders noncooperatively choose signal structures that disclose information about their valuations. We show that an equilibrium exists in this two-stage game and that in every equilibrium the object is sold with probability one. Our main result concerns the consequences of information disclosure for the auctioneer's revenue. If in the benchmark without disclosure the object remains unsold with positive probability, then disclosure yields strictly higher revenue in every equilibrium.
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