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作者：Baliga, Sandeep; Sjoestroem, Tomas
作者单位：Northwestern University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：In bilateral holdup and moral hazard in teams models, introducing a third party allows implementation of the first best, even if renegotiation is possible. Fines paid to the third party provide incentives for truth-telling and investment. This result holds even if the third party is corruptible, as long as the grand coalition has access to the same contracting technology as any colluding subcoalition. (JEL D86, D82)
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作者：Gale, Douglas M.; Kariv, Shachar
作者单位：New York University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper reports an experimental study of trading networks. Networks are incomplete in the sense that each trader can only exchange assets with a limited number of other traders. The greater the incompleteness of the network, the more intermediation is required to transfer the assets between initial and final owners. The uncertainty of trade in networks constitutes a potentially important market friction. Nevertheless, we find the pricing behavior observed in the laboratory converges to comp...
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作者：Basso, Leonardo J.; Clements, Matthew T.; Ross, Thomas W.
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Saint Edward's University; University of British Columbia
摘要：Frequent flier plans (FFPs) may be the most famous of customer loyalty programs, and there are similar schemes in other industries. We present a theory that models FFPs as efforts to exploit the agency relations up between employers (who pay for tickets) and employees (who book travel). FFPs bribe employees to book flights at higher prices. While a single airline offering an FFP has an advantage, competing FFPs can result in lower profits for airlines even while ticket prices rise. Thus, in co...
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作者：Niederle, Muriel; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：Many markets encounter difficulty maintaining a thick marketplace because they experience transactions made at dispersed times. To address such problems, many markets try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted, and rejected. Examining such markets suggests it is difficult to establish a thick market at an efficient time if firms can make exploding offers, and workers cannot renege on early commitments. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding...
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Argenziano, Rossella
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Essex
摘要：This paper investigates pricing decisions and network choices in two-sided markets with network externalities. Consumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the externality. Imposing restrictions on the extent of coordination failure among consumers generates clear qualitative conclusions about equilibrium market configurations. Multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium, both in the case of a monopolist network provider and in the case of competing providers. These equilibri...
