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作者：Baliga, Sandeep; Sjoestroem, Tomas
作者单位：Northwestern University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：In bilateral holdup and moral hazard in teams models, introducing a third party allows implementation of the first best, even if renegotiation is possible. Fines paid to the third party provide incentives for truth-telling and investment. This result holds even if the third party is corruptible, as long as the grand coalition has access to the same contracting technology as any colluding subcoalition. (JEL D86, D82)
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作者：Gale, Douglas M.; Kariv, Shachar
作者单位：New York University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper reports an experimental study of trading networks. Networks are incomplete in the sense that each trader can only exchange assets with a limited number of other traders. The greater the incompleteness of the network, the more intermediation is required to transfer the assets between initial and final owners. The uncertainty of trade in networks constitutes a potentially important market friction. Nevertheless, we find the pricing behavior observed in the laboratory converges to comp...
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作者：Basso, Leonardo J.; Clements, Matthew T.; Ross, Thomas W.
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Saint Edward's University; University of British Columbia
摘要：Frequent flier plans (FFPs) may be the most famous of customer loyalty programs, and there are similar schemes in other industries. We present a theory that models FFPs as efforts to exploit the agency relations up between employers (who pay for tickets) and employees (who book travel). FFPs bribe employees to book flights at higher prices. While a single airline offering an FFP has an advantage, competing FFPs can result in lower profits for airlines even while ticket prices rise. Thus, in co...
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作者：Niederle, Muriel; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：Many markets encounter difficulty maintaining a thick marketplace because they experience transactions made at dispersed times. To address such problems, many markets try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted, and rejected. Examining such markets suggests it is difficult to establish a thick market at an efficient time if firms can make exploding offers, and workers cannot renege on early commitments. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding...
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Argenziano, Rossella
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Essex
摘要：This paper investigates pricing decisions and network choices in two-sided markets with network externalities. Consumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the externality. Imposing restrictions on the extent of coordination failure among consumers generates clear qualitative conclusions about equilibrium market configurations. Multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium, both in the case of a monopolist network provider and in the case of competing providers. These equilibri...
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作者：Benabou, Roland; Vellodi, Nikhil
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We study a sequential experimentation model with endogenous feedback. Agents choose between a safe and risky action, the latter generating stochastic rewards. When making this choice, each agent is selfishly motivated (myopic). However, agents can disclose their experiences to a public record, and when doing so are prosocially motivated (forward-looking). Disclosure is both polarized (only extreme signals are disclosed) and positively biased (no feedback is bad news). The extent of disclosure ...
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作者：De los Santos, Babur; O'Brien, Daniel P.; Wildenbeest, Matthijs R.
作者单位：Clemson University; University of Arizona; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies the pricing implications of wholesale and agency contracts when input terms are determined through bargaining. We develop a structural Nash-in-Nash bargaining model and show that the distribution of bargaining power determines whether agency contracts raise or lower retail prices relative to wholesale contracts. We apply the model to the e-book market, which transitioned from wholesale to agency contracts after the expiration of a ban on agency contracting. Estimates indicat...
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作者：Camboni, Matteo; Porcellacchia, Michael
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW)
摘要：In a model of moral hazard in teams, we demonstrate that firms'concerns about low trust among teammates can justify two common but otherwise puzzling patterns: information waste and transparency trap. We find firms predominantly employ individual performance bonuses, ignoring that relevant information about team output and competition for better contracts leads workers into a self-defeating race toward effort transparency. Notably, the firm may be indifferent to or benefit from trust concerns,...
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作者：Decarolis, Francesco; Li, Muxin; Paternollo, Filippo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Fudan University; Shanghai Institute for Mathematics & Interdisciplinary Sciences; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper offers the first systematic quantitative assessment of default-option interventions designed to mitigate Google's search dominance. By analyzing interventions in the European Economic Area (EEA), Russia, and Turkey, we find that across all three cases, changes to default settings effectively reduced Google's market share. The causal impact amounts to less than 1 percentage point in the EEA and over 10 percentage points in Russia and Turkey. Differences arise from intervention nuance...
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作者：Hossain, Tanjim; Morgan, John
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We model decisions to apply for college admission, attend job auditions, or run for C-suite positions as costly entry into meritocracies, where the entrant with the highest ability wins a reward. Ability is privately known and players generically differ in commonly known characteristics such as ability distributions, entry costs, or payoffs from winning. Any infinitesimal difference leads to wildly different equilibrium entry probabilities, explaining large dispersion in representation of comp...
