Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schiffer, Burkhard C.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170139
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 321-352
• 关键词: Uncoupled dynamics; equilibrium; CONVERGENCE; experience; EVOLUTION; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We show there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be evolutionary stable, or that could learn itself Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach a learning opponent to secure at least the Stackelberg leader payoff This observation holds even when we restrict to generic games, two-player games, potential games, games with strategic complements, or 2 x 2 games, in which learning is known to be nice. It also applies to uncoupled learning heuristics leading to correlated equilibria, rationalizability, iterated admissibility, or minimal CURB sets.