Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Two-Sided Monopoly Platform

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jeon, Doh-Shin; Kim, Byung-Cheol; Menicucci, Domenico
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Florence
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190369
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 322-369
• 关键词: competition; media

摘要

We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The incentive constraints of the agents on the value creation side may be in conflict with internalizing externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal. Even without such conflict between the two sides, pooling may be optimal due to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agents diverge from those of the average agents on the value capture side. We perform a welfare analysis of price discrimination and show that prohibiting price discrimination improves welfare when there is a strong conflict between the two sides.