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作者：Che, Xiaogang; LI, Tong; Lu, Jingfeng; Zheng, Xiaoyong
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London; Vanderbilt University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We examine optimal auction design when buyers may receive future outside offers. The winning bidder may choose to default upon observing her outside offer. Under the optimal mechanism, the bidder with the highest value wins if and only if her value is above a cutoff, and the winner never defaults. The optimal auction takes the form of a second-price auction with a reserve price and a deposit by the winning bidder. Under regularity conditions, both the optimal reserve price and the deposit incr...
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作者：Prat, Andrea; Valletti, Tommaso
作者单位：Columbia University; Imperial College London
摘要：We model digital platforms as attention brokers that have proprietary information about their users' product preferences and sell targeted ad space to retail product industries. Retail producers-incumbents or entrants-compete for access to this attention bottleneck. We dis-cuss when increased concentration among attention brokers results in a tightening of the attention bottleneck, leading to higher ad prices, fewer ads being sold to entrants, and lower consumer welfare in the product industri...
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作者：Markovich, Sarit; Yehezkel, Yaron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider platform competition for small users and a user group. One platform enjoys a quality advantage and the other benefits from favorable beliefs. We study whether the group mitigates the users' coordination problem-i.e., joining a low-quality platform because they believe that other users would do the same. We find that a group that can facilitate coordination on the high-quality platform may choose to maintain the dominance of the low-quality one. Users' utility is non-monotonic in th...
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作者：Perez-Saiz, Hector; Xiao, Hongyu
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; University of Pennsylvania; Bank of Canada
摘要：We estimate a perfect information static entry game to study the effect of cultural entry barriers on entry and competition in the retail banking industry. Canada provides a favorable setting for analysis due to its high linguistic diversity, concentrated market, and regulatory entry barriers. We find that cultural affinity between customers and financial institutions that share a common cultural origin plays an important role in explaining the comparative advantages of these institutions in c...
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作者：Dogan, Battal; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：University of Bristol; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：In the context of priority-based allocation of objects , we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms of their stability. We intro-duce three basic properties that a reasonable stability comparison should satisfy. We show that for any stability comparison satisfy-ing the three properties , the top trading cycles mechanism is mini-mally unstable among efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms when objects have unit capacities. Our unifying approach covers basically all natural stability c...
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作者：Dur, Umut; Pathak, Parag A.; Song, Fei; Sonmez, Tayfun
作者单位：North Carolina State University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
摘要：This paper analyzes the Taiwan mechanism used nationwide for high school assignment starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score, with larger penalties for lower-ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a hybrid of the Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless remains in use.
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作者：Fuchs, William; Green, Brett; Levine, David
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A large literature examines demand-side barriers to product adoption. In this paper, we examine supply-side barriers in a setting with limited contract enforcement. We model the relationship between a distributor and its credit-constrained vendors. We show that the optimal self-enforcing arrangement can be implemented by providing vendors with a line of credit and the option to buy additional units at a fixed price. Moreover, the structure of this arrangement is optimal both for profit-maximiz...
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作者：Blavatskyy, Pavlo; Ortmann, Andreas; Panchenko, Valentyn
作者单位：Montpellier Business School; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：The Allais Paradox, or the common consequence effect, is a well-known behavioral regularity in individual decision-making under risk. Data from 81 experiments reported in 29 studies reveal that the Allais Paradox is a fragile empirical finding. The Allais Paradox is likely to be observed in experiments with high hypothetical payoffs, the medium outcome being close to the highest outcome and when lotteries are presented as a probability distribution (not in a compound form). The Allais Paradox ...
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作者：Ngangoue, M. Kathleen; Weizsaecker, Georg
作者单位：New York University; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：Our experiments investigate the extent to which traders learn from the price, differentiating between situations where orders are submitted before versus after the price has realized. In simultaneous markets with bids that are conditional on the price, traders neglect the information conveyed by the hypothetical value of the price. In sequential markets where the price is known prior to the bid submission, traders react to price to an extent that is roughly consistent with the benchmark theory...
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作者：Schummer, James; Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even wizen the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others' preferences. We pr...
